

BENEATH APPEARING

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Let us start with the following two propositions of Husserl:

Wer rettet uns vor einer Realisierung des Bewusstseins. Der wäre der Retter der Philosophie, ja der Schöpfer der Philosophie.

(Who saves us from a realization of the consciousness. This one would be the savior, even the creator of philosophy.)

These two sentences can be found in Manuscript A I 36, p. 193a from 1920. It must be emphasized that the "*Realisierung*" in question here is not a "reification" (as this term is usually translated), but indeed a "realization" (for there are entities that are not "things", but that nevertheless fall under the regime of the "*real*", for instance functions, structures, etc.). However, *consciousness is in no way "real"*. The main objective of the present contribution is to draw radical consequences from this.

It seems to me that, among the different possibilities of identifying phenomenology and its "*idea*", there are two that, in recent times, stand out and predominate: "realist" phenomenology and – still and again – "transcendental" phenomenology (knowing that, obviously, the first one has currently taken over the second one). What distinguishes these two orientations?

As we know, both start from the point of view that the phenomenological analyses must be oriented in relation to an *object* and that it is of this object that it is a question of bringing to light the modes of *constitution*. But whereas realist phenomenology, in its most general form, considers the object as the *exclusive* thread of its approaches, and sets up this object – insofar as it is considered as *pregiven* – as the *only* scale of the phenomenological analyses, transcendental phenomenology does not question *only* the objective donation, but *extends* the phenomenological interrogation in the direction of the "*phenomenality*" of the *phenomenon*. And this can lead – if necessary – to the *disconnection* of phenomenality and objectivity; the phenomenon will then be considered as *pure* phenomenon. Examples for this are the Husserlian "time-objects [*Zeitobjekte*]", the pure "'appearing' as appearing"¹ in Fink or the "phenomena as nothing but phenomena" in Richir. – But there may be other criteria to separate realist and transcendental phenomenology – for instance, perhaps, the fact of turning towards a phenomenology of *singular* experience, on the one hand, or towards transcendental and *universal Wesensstrukturen*, on the other. –

Through my own work, I am following the second direction, that of a transcendental phenomenology. Not so much because of any reserve towards "realism" (and even then – I will come back to it in conclusion), but because the attachment to the origins and to the beginnings – always to be renewed – of phenomenology justifies this fidelity to the transcendental. Now, for decades, the idea of a transcendental phenomenology has become considerably more complex. Today I would like to take stock of this and to show why and in what way the elaboration of a *transcendental* phenomenology *cannot be disconnected from a descent into the*

¹ E. Fink, *Sein, Wahrheit, Welt. Vor-Fragen zum Problem des Phänomen-Begriffs*, Den Haag, M. Nijhoff, 1958. Cf. also the Heideggerian expression of the "appearance of the appearance" (used in a dialogue written in 1953/54, but not published until 1959), *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, HGA 12, F.-W. von Herrmann (ed.), Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1985, p. 125.

"*beyond of appearing*". I thus come back – certainly in another way since I will always have in view the said "phenomenality of the phenomenon" – I thus come back to the question of the link, in phenomenology, between the apparent and the inapparent. This descent into the beneath appearing will be carried out in three different ways.

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The entry in this problematic will be initiated from what one could call the "internal border of the phenomenal field"² (thus the "subjective" border, so to speak, or the "immanent" border) or from what I called myself, in my first works on Husserl, the "pre-immanent sphere" of the phenomenological field.

The "phenomenological field" is more complex than it seems. Classically, it is understood from the Husserlian affirmation according to which, with *epoche* and reduction, a "new world" opens up, that of *Sinnbildung*. These methodological tools of *epoche* and reduction allow, by using the thread of constituted objectivities, to bring to light the constitutive structures or processes of these objectivities. According to Husserl, this concerns the different types of intentionality which correspond to the types of objects previously highlighted by the phenomenologist. These intentionalities are not visible or are not "conscious" in the natural attitude. To bring them to light requires a change of gaze. What lets it be established is always under the reign of an intuitive evidence. And the whole of these structures or processes constitutes precisely the "new world" indicated at the moment. These are obviously very well known things.

However, it happens that there are phenomenological problems which are not soluble at the level of the immanent sphere. The most well-known example concerns the phenomenology of time and more particularly the constitution of the immanent temporality itself. If the temporality of the appearing objects (certainly bracketed by *epoche*) is constituted by the "subjective" modes of the retentive and protentive intentionality, what about the temporality of these modes themselves? Is it in turn constituted by more buried "subjective" modes or does it require a constitution in objective temporality? In the first case, the same question would arise again with respect to the temporality of these new modes – does it in turn require such a "subjective" constitution? – and we would risk falling into an infinite regression. In the second case, we would fall into a petition of principle, because what we were trying to account for from the start, were precisely the objective modes of temporality. Husserl envisages a perspective to solve this problem by opening the sphere of what he calls a "pre-phenomenal" or "pre-immanent" temporality³. This notion of a "pre-phenomenality" or a "pre-immanence" was already introduced in 1907 in *Ding und Raum*. But the phenomenology of time and space is not the only case of the "pre-phenomenality" or the "pre-immanence" in phenomenology. We can refer for example to the phenomenology of the intersubjectivity, of the "original hylè (*Urhylè*)", etc.

But what exactly is "found" in this pre-immanent sphere? Husserl's texts, even his manuscripts, do not inform us about this. And we notice, in a more general way, that the phenomenological literature has practically never examined this problematic. The reason for this is that it is an "operative" approach (in the sense that Fink could speak of "operative concepts"). In my elaborations of a "constructive" or "generative" phenomenology – a real "dive" into pre-immanence – I try to contribute to fill this gap.

To be able to say what one "finds" in the pre-immanent sphere, it would be necessary first of all to make considerations of a methodological order. In *Wirklichkeitsbilder* and *Seinsschwingungen*, I have developed at length which extensions are necessary, on the level of

² See the excellent work of S. Jullien, *La phénoménologie en suspens. Derrida et la question de l'apparaître*, Dixmont/Wuppertal, Association Internationale de Phénoménologie, "Mémoires des Annales de Phénoménologie", vol. XIV, 2020.

³ See the last two texts of section B of *Husserliana X*.

the method, to give an account of what is here at stake. This concerns in particular the tools of the "phenomenological construction" (beneath the description), of the "hypophysical *epoche*" (a kind of "*epoche* in the *epoche*) and of the "phenomenological induction" (leading *into* the pre-immanence). These are the "counterparts" – thus belonging to the *pre-immanent* sphere – of the phenomenological description, of the *epoche* and of the reduction to the level of the immanent sphere, on which I cannot come back (I thus refer to these two works). Then, I want to specify that what is presented here expresses a very firm position with regard to the necessity, for phenomenology, to take seriously *theoretical* stakes, touching on what classically has been called stakes pertaining to knowledge (we shall see in which sense I understand this term). Recently, there has been talk of all sorts of "turning points" in phenomenology. I have the impression that these "turns" have in fact the essential objective of *turning away* from the initial theoretical stakes of phenomenology. I would like to make *another voice* heard, one that engages in a rehabilitation of the question of "knowledge" in phenomenology (taking into account, of course, the criticisms of Husserlian epistemology, which requires, such is one of the theses defended here with which I distance myself from the "mainstream", to take into account "speculative" elements).

So I come back to my question: what is "found" in the pre-immanent sphere? If we consider this question from a strictly theoretical point of view, we can detect three fundamental operative steps, I would say: three synthetic operations or "syntheses" (to which correspond three kinds of "phenomenological constructions"). – Since the first deduction of categories in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), the idea that there are "three syntheses" has had an important future in transcendental philosophy: I will only mention the three syntheses of the understanding of the "*A-Deduction*" in Kant, the three passive syntheses of time in Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*, or the passive syntheses of the first, second and third degree in Richir's *Phenomenological Meditations*. – The first type of synthesis is a "*post factum* synthesis"; the second is a "radical synthesis", aiming at an *ultimate unity*; the third a "genetic synthesis". To be a little more precise: the first synthesis always seeks (for example in Husserl or Merleau-Ponty) a foundation for an antithetical opposition (but in the manner of a perfectly assumed *post factum* synthesis) – for example: a synthetic term for the opposition between objective temporality and subjective temporality or for that between the egological dimension and the intersubjective dimension of transcendental subjectivity; the second synthesis moves radically towards a *unitary principle* – for example: the self-affective life in Michel Henry or the phenomenological sublime in Richir (which bears different names in him but always aims at the same principle); the third synthesis *rejects* the idea of a *post factum* synthesis and elaborates, by means of a generative synthesis, a quasi-dialectical conception of the legitimation of knowledge (or of the "transcendental making-comprehensible" [*transzendentes Verständlichmachen*], to use Husserl's terms in the *Krisis*). Such a conception has not been developed in the history of phenomenology; it constitutes another attempt to contribute to the elucidation of phenomenology understood as transcendental idealism. Before developing further what is at stake here, I will now move on to the second way of accessing the "beneath appearing".

This second way is the one through the "transcendental logic". What is "transcendental logic"? It aims at two things. It seeks to establish the validity of a possible *a priori* relation to the object; and it aims at a self-foundation of knowledge. In what sense should we understand "knowledge" here? This brings us back to the question of the theoretical stakes that I put forward just now. It is not a question of a classical epistemological perspective, but of a type of understanding that makes understanding self-transparent. It is by taking knowledge in this sense that philosophy reveals itself in its eminent sense (this is not expressed in this way in Kant, who was the first to found transcendental logic; on the other hand, it is the idea governing Fichte's

project and, in another sense, Husserl's). And it is indeed Kant, Fichte and Husserl who conceived the three fundamental and decisive programs of a "transcendental logic".

According to Kant, transcendental logic deals with the relation of thought to the object insofar as this relation is thought in a "pure" way (by means of categories and their deduction) and that this relation is governed by the principles of pure understanding.

For Fichte, the purpose of transcendental logic is to generate what, for Kant, is a given: namely, the *factum* of the faculties of knowledge (sensibility and understanding) and the "supreme point" that is transcendental apperception. Its starting point is thus "knowledge" (in the sense indicated just now) as coincidence and inseparability of thought and intuition. The transcendental-logical concept through which Fichte unfolds the structure of knowledge is the concept of *image*. This one represents the content of knowledge. And it is self-reflective, it makes itself evident to itself. Fichte also calls it "appearance" (*Erscheinung*). The task of transcendental logic is thus the *genetic construction of appearance* as the *genetic construction of the reflexive and self-evident structure of knowledge*⁴. Transcendental logic as the place of a pure genesis of knowledge deduces in Fichte the imaginal form of the content of this knowledge (this content itself will later be the object of the theory of science [*Wissenschaftslehre*]).

As for Husserl, he does not defend the idea of a separation between form and content of knowledge, dissociating, as it is the case with Fichte, the transcendental logic from the doctrine of science proper. In order to be able to specify how this is presented more precisely in Husserl's case, let me recall his distinction between the different eidetic sciences (*eidetische Wissenschaften*).

Husserl distinguishes between the *formal* eidetic science and the *material* eidetic science. The first one is the formal logic which is divided in its turn into a formal apophantic (= doctrine of the forms of judgment) and a formal ontology (= doctrine of the forms of objects in general). It is the *material* eidetic science which corresponds to the transcendental logic. It studies the pure consciousness which, taken in its radicality, is at the origin of the "content" or "matter" of the objects – and not of the forms which, once again, belong to the formal logic. The central methodological concepts of Husserlian transcendental logic are those of intuitive evidence and description. His transcendental logic as a descriptive phenomenology deals then with the relation to the object understood in its eidetic-material dimension.

Now, the thesis defended here is that this way of situating transcendental logic (in phenomenology) entirely on the side of the eidetic-material *does not take into account the fact that there are aspects pertaining to the said genesis of the reflexive structure of knowledge* which are *neither* purely formal (and thus do not belong to formal logic), *nor* "material" in Husserl's sense. Husserl has left a free space in the transcendental logic – where one would expect the *legitimization* of the relation to the object and of all that is established in the "material" part. The genesis of the reflexive structure of knowledge must be *integrated* into the phenomenological field, it must be made a phenomenological phenomenon *within the TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC itself*. And the three syntheses (or "synthetic operations") mentioned above constitute precisely the object of this *new* part of phenomenological transcendental logic (which I would call a "*generative* transcendental logic"). The aim here is not only to highlight a gap in the architectonics of the Husserlian eidetic sciences, but also to elaborate a device to fill this gap.

I come finally to the third possible way of access to the "beneath appearing". Following Husserl, László Tengelyi has developed the concept of a "metaphysics of the original facts (*Urtatsachen*)", which is supported by a "methodological transcendentalism". These primordial

⁴ Does this mean that it would be allowed to simply short-circuit the phenomenological concept of phenomenon (Husserl) and the transcendental concept of phenomenon (Fichte)? It is precisely the function of pre-immanence to make it possible to build a bridge between the two.

facts are first of all: the "I", the "world", the "intersubjectivity" and the "history" (or the "historical teleology"). If these facts take the place of the "I", the "World" and God, inherited from the classical "*metaphysica specialis*", Tengelyi also proceeds to a transformation of the "*metaphysica generalis*", insofar as a fifth fact, namely the "fact of appearing" itself, is taken into account in this development. Following Fink and Richir, "appearing as appearing" thus also becomes in Tengelyi a basic concept of phenomenology (insofar as it is in line with traditional metaphysics).

However, it should be stressed that what is at stake here is what Tengelyi has called the "structures of facticity"⁵ characteristic of the immanent sphere. The question then arises whether there is a counterpart or a parallel of these structures at the level of the *pre-immanent* sphere? Can we speak of "structures of transcendental" there? Another thesis of this contribution will consist in making us see – and this constitutes precisely this third possible way of access to the "beneath appearing" – that there are two kinds of "pre-phenomenal structures" or "transcendental structures", precisely, which present themselves at this level: the three syntheses introduced above and also three fundamental concepts which are: correlation, sense (*Sinn*) and reflection. For this point, to which I will return, I refer to §48 of the *Krisis* and to §55⁶ and 77⁷ of the *Ideen I*. And I also refer to a quotation from Walter Biemel who was the first to draw attention to this same point: "That something is understood when psychic acts are grasped in *reflection* as *intentional*, which [acts] are indispensable for the origin of *sense*, is a fundamental idea (*Grundeinsicht*) of phenomenology⁸."

We have just seen that the speculative dimension in this consideration of the "beneath appearing" is reached by the descent in the "pre-immanent" or "pre-phenomenal" sphere and by a consideration of a non-material transcendental logic (in phenomenology). This one puts effectively in evidence and develops the "structures of transcendental". How to proceed from there? The beginning of an answer to this question will be the object of my second part.

We are here in a situation close to that of Kant. The transcendental was mobilized in him to solve *ad hoc* problems. For example: what makes it possible to account for the fact that we can be *affected* by something? What makes possible the *synthesis of the diverse in an object*? What makes it possible to *unify* – or relate to each other – intuitions and concepts (which are heterogeneous representations)? How can we formulate the *principles* which command the *a priori* relation between our representations and the object? Etc.

It is the same thing with Husserl's pre-immanence or pre-phenomenality – it is mobilized only in precise and each time quite different cases. Now, as we can show quite easily, what commands the passage from the Kantian transcendental to the Fichtean and Husserlian transcendental (at least at the level of the immanent sphere), is the necessity to make the transcendental *intuitive*. But this way is not possible here, because the passage to the pre-immanence consists very precisely in *going beneath* the sphere of the intuition or the evidence. What we have here, as we have seen, are the structures of transcendental. What allows us to go further is the *self-reflexive processuality* of these structures. Fink already said in this respect in the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*: the phenomenalization, in its deepest layers, does not

⁵ "*Faktizitätsstrukturen*", L. Tengelyi, *Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik* (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 2014), p. 184.

⁶ See also § 129 of *Ideen I*. Cf. also, with respect to the "pre-expressive" sphere, § 124 of the same work.

⁷ In the *C Manuscripts*, Husserl says about the "original method of all philosophical methods" (an expression that reminds us of the "principle of all principles") that it is the "transcendental reduction", "a quite specific reflection", *Husserliana Materialien*, vol. VIII, p. 16. Elsewhere, in these same *C Manuscripts*, Husserl specifies that "the radical reflection is the *epoche*", *ibid.*, p. 9.

⁸ W. Biemel, "Die entscheidenden Phasen der Entfaltung von Husserls Philosophie", *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, April-June, 1959, vol. 13, book 2, Erweitertes Heft zum 100. Geburtstag von Edmund Husserl (April-June, 1959), p. 200.

constitute a "human attitude", but a "transcendental happening [...] as a happening of the *transcendental self-movement of the constitutive life*"⁹.

We reach here, so to speak, the limits of the transcendental. Let us now see what self-reflexive processes are carried out from there.

It is nothing other than the elaboration of a "generative matrix of *Sinnbildung*" from the three fundamental concepts of correlation, sense and reflection. This matrix already appears in various forms in the phenomenological literature. I simply refer to what Heidegger named, in the *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, the "*Grundgeschehen* [fundamental happening]" of his "metaphysics of the world"¹⁰ or to what Richir called, in volume I of *Phénomènes, temps et êtres*, the "transcendental matrix" of his own refoundation of transcendental phenomenology. Now, here, the "generative matrix of *Sinnbildung*" corresponds to the third synthesis presented above; we could show that it is a synthesis of the first two, a "synthesis of syntheses" at the heart of a "generative" or "constructive" phenomenology.

I will briefly explain what the approach is. The idea is that there are three fundamental concepts of phenomenology – correlation, sense and reflection – introduced by Husserl but that he did not reflect either for themselves or with respect to their interrelation. The object here is to make of this interrelation a properly phenomenological phenomenon which will fill the gap of the non-material part of the phenomenological transcendental logic. But, once again, and such is the specificity emerging from the previous considerations on pre-immanence, this takes place in a *self-reflexive processuality*. This is concretized in what I call the "generative matrix of *Sinnbildung*". I specify once again the three elements or motives.

The first fundamental motive in the elaboration of such a "generative matrix" consists in making the *transcendental-phenomenological correlation* itself the theme of the reflection¹¹. What is the phenomenological correlation? From this question follows the second motive, which is to establish once and for all as a phenomenological phenomenon the principle not of *knowledge*, but of the "*making-comprehensible*" of *phenomenological knowledge* and thus the essence of *Sinnbildung*. Finally (and this will be the third motive), it will be a question of clarifying the nature of the *phenomenological reflection* itself.

Correlativity (correlation), significativity (sense) and reflexivity (reflection)¹² – these are the three fundamental concepts that cross in their coappartenance and in their mutual relations the generative matrix of sense being made. The following project develops thus according to the content or the specific "*Sachhaltigkeit*" of a phenomenality that encompasses the sensible and reflexive structure of the phenomenological correlativity, the significativity and the reflexivity, whose interrelation appears as an outstanding phenomenological phenomenon.

Let us therefore develop the content of these three concepts. The first one is the phenomenological *correlation*. What underlies, it is, as we know, "intentionality". If intentionality is not simply a *doubling* of the given in a modality of consciousness, nor the fact that something given is *actually* conscious, and if it is a question of explaining afterwards how the *Sinnbildung*, i.e. the constitutive configuration of the sense of the appearing, is possible, then it is necessary to bring to light the fundamental characteristic assuring each time the

⁹ E. Fink, *VI. Cartesianische Meditation*, p. 124.

¹⁰ M. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, HGA 29/30, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1983, § 74, pp. 507-512.

¹¹ Cf. already R. Barbaras, *Dynamique de la manifestation*, Paris, Vrin, 2013, p. 272 and p. 256.

¹² This inner and essential co-ownership of correlation, sense and reflection must attract the attention of the transcendental phenomenologist. The "correlativity" is a fundamental structure (pertaining as much to epistemology as to ontology) of the transcendental philosophy and of the transcendental phenomenology in particular. It is the framework and the horizon of any reflexive seizure of sense as well as of any reflection *on* sense and within significativity. It consists in the subject-object correlation, but – on a higher level – it is also a correlation of reflexivity and significativity. These in turn refer to each other. Significance is self-reflexive and reflexivity is related to sense and always refers to it.

relation to the object. Such a fundamental property can be called – referring to the Heideggerian deepening of the Husserlian concept of intentionality which places this elaboration at a level beneath the separation of the epistemological and the ontological – a "pre-seizure opening the horizontality". The phenomenological correlation never designates a simply static or mechanical relation, it rather expresses the idea that any donation of "something" is inscribed in the horizontal framework of comprehensibility. This one is not necessarily "transparent" – far from it. It can be unconscious or "not actually conscious" in any other way. What matters only is that one opposes to the being-in-itself a perspective that reveals the being as *open* to consciousness, to being-conscious.

Now, *what is* "horizontally pre-seized" in the correlation? As Fink has rightly pointed out, the pre-seizure is always a pre-seizure of the *appearance of sense* (*Sinnerscheinung*) and of the *order of sense* (*Sinnordnung*)¹³. The sense designates in each case the *significance* as "sense of" something appearing. The appearing always appears "as [*als*]" something, and this constitutes the sense. This is, so to speak, the other side of the coin of the fact that the "something" is inscribed in the correlation: the object is not understood in its empirical existence, but as sense.

As for the modality of the specifically phenomenological "*reflection*" (which is always at the same time a self-reflection), it supposes the "transcendental induction" designating the specific performativity of the properly phenomenological form of reflection. The phenomenological (self-)reflection of these three concepts (revealing their interrelation) is accomplished in three times or at three levels.

I do not have time today to proceed to the complete deployment of this self-reflexive processuality at three levels of correlation, sense and reflection as well as of their interrelation. I refer for that to my book *Seinsschwingungen*. I will make only a brief summary of it, which is the following.

The *correlation* is underpinned by the intentionality that projects – or is projected into – the subject/object relation. If the latter – as the original split of consciousness – is seized as consciousness *of* consciousness, then self-consciousness emerges. Consciousness presupposes self-consciousness – but if the latter is self-reflective in its turn, it turns out to be underpinned by a pre-phenomenal and pre-subjective field (the pre-immanent or pre-phenomenal sphere we have already discussed).

The *sense* is projected into another duality – that of the *projected sense* and the *sense that is given* (because the project of the sense "responds" each time to a "donation" of the sense at the level of which the "adequacy" of this project can be verified in a progressive way and through constantly renewed "corrections"). When this duality is self-reflected, it appears that the scale of *truth* is each time displaced and cannot be applied in a definitive way. In other words, we encounter here a "hermeneutic truth" which does not lead to "ultimate truths", but which draws the consequences of the hermeneutic idea according to which truth is only the *accomplishment* of a truth always to be realized anew. The interiorizing self-reflection of this "hermeneutic truth" does not constitute a new "project of sense" or a new "interpretation" that could be surpassed in other projects or interpretations, but it returns to the concept of a phenomenological, generative "construction". It is about a construction in the open of the prephenomenal sphere that reveals its "adequacy" and its necessary "legality" only in the construction itself (and it can be either a *post factum* synthesis or a synthesis aiming at a radical unity). To this sphere of phenomenological and generative constructivity corresponds the concept of "generativity" or "generative truth" properly speaking.

Finally, the meaning of the *reflection* is revealed through the clarification of the principle of "transcendental making-comprehensibility", which has also already been discussed. This one is

¹³ See E. Fink, "Das Problem der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls" (1939), *Studien zur Phänomenologie* (1930-1939), Den Haag, M. Nijhoff, 1966, p. 205.

projected in the duality between a simple *concept* of this principle and this principle *itself*. The self-reflection of this duality makes it appear that this "simple concept" cannot be the original source of the elucidation of the principle of "transcendental making-comprehensible", but that it is precisely the concept that is opposed to it. The latter "conceives" itself in this (self)reflection *as a* simple concept. In order to be able to reach the source, this concept must in some way – *precisely in so far as it is only such a concept* – be annihilated. A simultaneous *project-and-annihilation* emerges. This one can be named "*plasticity*" (more exactly: "*reflexive plasticity*") because this term expresses precisely this double meaning of a projecting annihilation or of an annihilating projection. The interiorizing self-reflection of the reflexive plasticity, finally, is not only conceived as reflecting, but as opening the reflection *in its reflexive legality* (thus by revealing the laws of the reflection themselves pertaining to the "knowledge" and its legitimation). This consists in the "possibilizing", that is to say in a specific redoubling, which originally determines the transcendental and which makes transparent, in a reflexive way, the making-possible as the making-possible of the making-possible *itself* – in the present case: the plasticity of which the self-reflection precisely makes appear the possibilizing. This legality of reflection expresses, moreover – with the possibilization of understanding – a possibilization of *being* that is directly related to it. Why should we put forward this "possibilization of the being"? And above all: why does it appear "through" the possibilization of understanding? The first one because if the possibilization of understanding were purely reflexive and if it rested exclusively on an epistemological basis, then its character of possibilization would remain abstract and would amount to a simple affirmation. The last one because the possibilization is situated beneath the split between the theory of knowledge and ontology and that it makes it possible in the first place. The possibilizing redoubling thus gives rise to a higher order plasticity that we could call a "reflexible plasticity" (beyond the "reflexive plasticity"¹⁴ that was situated at the second level of reflection): this "reflexible plasticity" is indeed in its turn a productive and engendering annihilation – *annihilation* of all experimentable positivity of a conditioner and *engendering* of this conditioner itself giving itself as ontological "excess" which delivers the foundation there again ontologically to what is engendered by this (namely to the sought-after foundation of the elucidation of comprehension as well as, *inseparably*, to the "reality" of all appearing).

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To conclude, I will first bring together once again the main theses that have emerged in the foregoing.

I have tried to show, in the specification of the essence and the nature of the phenomenological field, that it is necessary to take into account the *pre-phenomenal* or *pre-immanent* dimension of this field. This dimension or this pre-phenomenal sphere is not empty, but it makes appear "structures of transcendental", namely: three types of synthesis and three fundamental concepts of phenomenology. The next step consisted in the highlighting of these fundamental concepts of phenomenology as they are articulated in a "generative matrix of *Sinnbildung*". The deployment of these concepts within this "matrix" was to assume a "self-reflexive processuality". This gives rise to two fundamental results: on the one hand, it fills a gap in the architectonics of transcendental phenomenology – namely, that of the necessity of integrating and giving due place to the genetic and self-reflexive structure of knowledge within the non-material part of phenomenological transcendental logic, in order to clarify what underlies the idea of "comprehension" in phenomenology; and, on the other hand, it gives rise to the elaboration of a phenomenology of inapparence which presents itself as a *speculative*

¹⁴ The difference between "reflexivity" and "reflexibility" consists in the fact that the latter makes appear precisely the *law of reflection* of the former.

phenomenology of inapparence (or of "inconspicuous") – two seemingly oxymoronic characterizations which rather testify to the complexity of transcendental phenomenology. (For the "ontological" part, only very briefly sketched for lack of time, I allow myself to refer to *Seinsschwingungen* which develops the question of the relation between "reflection" and "reality").

And I will end now to say in a more general way what justifies all the same my *reservations* towards a "realist phenomenology" and what calls, in my eyes, for a renewal of a transcendental phenomenology. – By doing so, I may not do justice to *all* realist phenomenologists (who may not all recognize themselves in it), but I will make clear, I hope, how I understand the "realism" from which I would like to distance myself. – These reservations are of an epistemological, ethical and aesthetic order. I will be very brief. First of all, realism gives itself what it is first of all a question of clarifying and justifying. Correlation, for example, is no more for it an unquestionable datum than the being-in-itself of reality (the same is true for sense and reflection). Realism asserts the inanity of even asking this *question*, and this seems to me to be clearly too short-sighted. Secondly, to assert dogmatically the "*es ist so*" (the "it is like that") of a reality given in advance poses an ethical problem to me. From the conception of such a given in advance of the being or of the real, it is only a step towards the obligation to accept all that goes with it – namely: the real with respect to its order, its institutions, its encrusted structures, its inertia. The contestation of an uncritically posed real is at the same time an ethical and moral call. And it is not from any assumed philosophical position that it would be a question of giving a moral lesson (I anticipate the reproaches on this point), but, on the contrary, it must be the ethical posture that commands our philosophical choices. Finally, thirdly, I also have reservations of an aesthetic nature (but which are inseparable from the ethical aspect): what disturbs me in the realist position, at least when it is posed as a whole, is a certain lack of sensitivity towards doubt, flaws, gaps, abysses. I think that if phenomenology has something to do with Descartes' thought, it is not so much because of the fact that one has to look for a *fundamentum inconcussum*, as Heidegger says, but because the genius malignus remains *everywhere* a "real" threat. And, in my view – I say this half humorously, but really no more than half – realism simply lacks the *poetry* (in all senses of the word) and the *love for fiction* to assume such a position.